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Taufik,Abdullab
"The Clash of Civilization": A Prognosis
of the Future or the Lure of the Past
Abstraksi: Antbusiasme respon masyarakat Indonesia terhadap "rhe
Clash of Civilization" Samuel P. Huntington bisa dijelaskan karena
dta hal. Pertama, Indonesia adalah negma-bangsa dengan penduduk Mts-
lim rcrbesar di dunia Islam-sebagaifaktor peradaban yangmenjadi basis
analisa dalam tesis tersebut- sudah barang tentu membentuk kesadaran
umat dan, dengan sendirinya, menarik minat sebagian besar kakngan
maryarakat Indonesia. Kedua, sifat provokatif yang dikandung tesis itu
te lah mengundang rnasyarakat untuk menyikapi secara hati-bati progno-
sis-prognosis politikyang bakal terladi di Indonesia sendiri. Apalagt tesis
Huntington dimunculkan di tengah bertiupnya angin politik Indonesia
yangmemberi tempdt bagi Iskm pada awal deka"de 1990an.
Tulisan yang juga bisa dipandang sebagai salah satu respon terhadap
tesis the Clash of Civilization ini ingin menguji kembali kecermatan
analisis Huntington dakm konteks heunikan Islam di Indonesia.
Teorithe Clash of Civilization dipresenasikan Samuel Huntingron
pertdmd kali pada musim panas 1993. Ia berpendapat, berahhirnya Per-
ang Dingin dan berjayanya kapialisme sebagai ideologi yang mengalah-
kan s o si a li sm e, te kh m emb uka bab ak b ar u s ej ar ah m an us i a de n gan m un -
culnya suatu bentuk konflik baru-bukan konflik anrar negdra yd,ng ber-
kaiwn dengan kepentingan ekonomi dan perbatasan uilayah, rnelain-
kan konflik antar "peradaban". Di dalam konflik baru ini, negdrd-nega-
ra di dunia berlomba memenangkan keungulan baru pula, keunggul-
an legitimasi dan kebenaran kultural. Dari sini, Huntington berkesim-
pulan bahua di masa depan identias kultural adalah hal palingmenen-
tukan jalannya politik global.
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Identius ini tampaknyd akdn membentuk pok kohesi, disintegrasi,
dan konflik antar bangsd di era baru, Begttu pula, kebijakan-kebijakan
politik dan ekonomi negara-negara di dunia juga dibangun berdasarkan
garis pemisah kebudayaan dntar-negard, dan lebih utama lagi, berdasar-
kan identitas peradaban besar dunia: Barat, Kristen Ortodox, Islam,
Amerika Latin, Hindu, Cina, Jepang dan Afrikz. Mengikuti kesimpulan
ini Huntington melihat kecenderungan negdrd-negdra di Asiayang me-
rniliki persepsi berbeda-dan pada tingkat tertentu koffik-dalam hal-
hal yang selama ini dipandang uniaersal oleh Barat-Kristen, seperti
dem o kr asi, HAM dan ke setarazn laki- laki-perempuan.
Reaksi bermunculan mendngdpi cermat-tidaknya tesis itu diterap-
kan untuk me lihat peta peradaban bangsa-bangsa di dunia. Tak terhecuali
kalangan masayarakat akademik Indonesia. Pertanyaan yang diajukan
adalah, m un gkin kah seseor an g bisa men ggambar "peta peradab an " bagi
bangsa-bangsa di dunia berdasarkan asumsi'Clash"i Jika mungkin,
bagaimana seseorang akan memukul rata peradaban Islam yang
berkernbang di Timur Tengab, dengan peradaban yang tumbuh di ka-
langan masyarakat Muslim Asia Tengara? Ataukah, tesis benturan per-
adaban iru sesungguhnya ridak lebih dari retorika politik yang digali
dari masa lalu, ketika konflik antdr masyarakat seringkali juga muncul
dalam bentuk perang antar-agama?
Dengan demikian, kelemaban hakiki dari analisis Huntington-se-
bagaimana dikemukakan para pengkritik dari Indonesia-adalah gene-
ralisasi atds perddabdn-peradaban itu untuk diterapkzn k podo "negArd-
negdrd" tertentu. Asumsi Huntington dalam memerzkdn "peradaban k-
lam" pada Arab Saudi, Iran dan Afghanisan untuk menunjukkan opo-
sisi mereka terhadap universalitas HAM dan demokrasi, atau juga
"peradaban Konfusius" pada Cina komunis, telih membaxaanyd pada
kesimpulan yang mengingkari konteks internal negara-negdra itu. Jika
perjuangan menegakkan HAM dan demokrasi dari masyarakat di nega-
rd-negdra tertentu ke/ihatan melauan pemerintah, maka "clash" yorg
sebenarnya terjadi bukanlah benturan konsep HAM a.ntard peradaban
Barat-Kristen dengan peradaban Islam, melainkan suatu benturan an-
tara pemerinahan Muslim ydng tidak d.emokratis dengan masyarakat
yang dipimpinnya; atau konflik anura pemerinuh Komunis Cina yan g
anti demokrasi dengan masyarakatpro demokrasi. Dalam kerangka ini,
pea peradaban ydng dibuat Huntingron mengingkari keunikan perada-
ban-pera"daban itu pada tingkat lokalias;peradaban jaub lebih kompleks
dari sekedar persoakn-persoalan politik dan keamanan.
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he story begins when Samuel P. Huntington- the famous
political scientist from the highly prestigious Harvard
University, and a citizen of the most powerful nation on earth
- 
writes an article, entitled "The Clash of Civilization?' in Foreign
Affair.' Soon enough the article invites highly critical comments from
several scholars.t Not someone who can easily be discarded, Hun-
tington gives his response to his critics by asking a challenging ques-
tion, "If Not Civilizations, Vhat?". If anything the criticisms only
harden his conviction that civilization, instead of ideology, economy
or whatever, would become the basis of conflict in the Post Cold
Var period.r He does not stop with this rather cynical quesrion, he
writes a book with the same subject and title, but without a quesrion
mark.n Huntington, "the seeker', has in the meantime become the
"true believer"-as Eric Hoffer would have called him. He also de-
fends his position in several interviews he gives after the publication
of the book.
The main theses of Huntington have by now become widely
known. Tbe Clash of Civilization is a very comprehensive and well-
planned book. Any attempt to summarize it would nor do justice to
the subtleties of the book's argumenrs. Anyway the book , like the
article, starts from a thesis that the end of the Cold 'War has brought
with it a change in the character of global politics. It is now
multicivilizational and it is also multipolar. There are seven (or pos-
sibly eight) contempora ry civilizations-rVestern, Orthodox, Latin
American, Sinic, Hindu, hlamic , Japan, and (possibly) African civi-
lizations. Societies sharing cultural affinities cooperare with each other
and group themselves politically under the leadership of the "core
state" of their respective civilizations.
Relations between states belonging ro the same civilization are
closer than the relationship among srares from differenr civilizations.
Inter-civilizational relationships can have varying degrees of conflict.
\7hile the relationship between Islamic and'Western civilizations is a
conflictual relationship, that between Wesrern Civilization and the
Latin American civilization is less conflicrual. Actually, Huntington
tends to suggest that the relationships berween the Islamic civrliza-
tion and other civilizations also vary in terms of the degree of con-
flict, even though he also foresees rhe strong possibility that the Is-
lamic and the Sinic civilizations would form an alliance in their oo-
position to the'!fesr.
Although the lVest has been the dominant driving force in the
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process of modernization of the world, it cannot's0esternize the non-\western societies. since the end of the cold \war that \wesrern civili-
zation has begun to decline, whiie the Asian civilizations, on rhe
other hand, have economically, militarily and politicaily been ex-
panding. Non-'western civilizations have begun to reaffirm rhe in-
trinsic excellence of their civilizations. The strengthening of the
civilizational identiries particularly occurs in the "f*lt lin.i of con-
flict' This tendency is most prevalent among the Muslims, whose
demographic explosion desrabilizes the muriicivilizationai world.
Flowever, "the greatest threats to world peace", according to him,
are "rhe conflicrs generated by'western universalism, Muilim mili-
tancy' and chinese assertion". The vest, therefore, shouid be aware
of the growing power of anti-vestern Islamic fundamentalism and
should deter the emergence of an anti-lvesrern Islamic-sinic alliance
system.
A real danger ro'wesrern civilization, however, resides in its own
core state, the United srares, where people begin to enrerrain the idea
of the united states being a muhicultural naiion. This idea is tanta-
mounr to transforming the united States into a united Nations and
to the rejection of the very foundation of wesrern civilization.
"Multiculturalism at home", he says, " threatens the us and the \west:
universalism abroad rhrearens the 'west and the world. Both denv
the uniqueness of the \7esr".
fn spite of the rigor of Huntington's argumenrs, several scholars
and intellectuals have seriously questioned rhe academic validity of
his.list of major conremporary civilizations, his model of using civili-
zations as the paradigm to undersrand and predict post coid vrar
global politics, and his rarher apocalyptic prognosis ,bout the future.
Some scholars find it rather srrange to see thal Huntington does not
pay enough attention to the roles of science, technology, economy
and even popular culture. "How can world peace be'maintained;,
Janadas Devan asks, "if the most important materiar elements of ev-
ery modern culture- science, technology and production- are sac-
rificed on the altar of cultural exclusivities?". others seriously ques-
tion Huntingron's refusal ro acknowledge the importanr roles pliyed
by several kinds of regional economic and political organizarions in
reducing conflict and enhancing internationar cooperitio.r. one re-
viewer asks a seemingly simple quesrion, " If other civilizations have
been around for cenrurie!*hy are they posing a charlenge onry now?'
To pur ir differently he, like some otheireviewers, is wondering how
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come Huntington who has constructed his "civilizations" from his
understanding of history forgets the internal historical dynamics of
civiiization. He " has found his civilizations whole and intact, water-
tight under an eternal sky", Fouad Ajami says.
Vhen Huntington flatly rejects Ajami's challenging dictum, "civi-
lizations do not control states, states control civilizations"" he does
not only show his understanding of history, but also his cultural de-
terminism. The article and the book illustrate how this cultural atti-
tude can easily entrap him into his own cultural and political preju-
dices in dealing with other civilizations. In the event, how can he
avoid the danger of being allured by the ever convenient Proscutean
bed? It is perhaps not too difficult ro find loopholes and weaknesses
in Huntingto.rt majo, design. After all, as a young indonesian intel-
lectual says, Huntington might have fallen into the slippery trap of
his "grand narrative". It fails to explain the intricate and complex
nature of inter-civilizational relationship."
It is fair enough for Huntington to defend the sanctity of lVestern
civilization. His descriptions and opinions on other civilizations,
particularly on Islam, clearly reveal how deeply he is in debt to the
tradition rightly called by Edward Said "orientalism"-that is an "ide-
ology" in the form of knowledge about Islam that emerges from con-
frontation, domination and cultural antipathy." He also demonstrates
the validity of Spurr's finding on the continuing influence of "the
rhetoric of empire" even in the academic discourse." Huntington's
"covering of Islam", as Said would have said, "is n-ot interpretation in
the genuine sense but an assertion of power"." Vho then would
wonder if Huntington's book is in more than one way also a warn-
ing to the Vestern world, "Beware the threat of Islam".
In spite of the highly complex problems that it tries to discuss,
Huntington's book is pleasant to read. It is well written and occa-
sionally adorned by light humor and challenging dictum and well-
thought aphorisms. As a matter of taste the book can easily pass as a
romantic political thriller-well designed, excellent plot, packed with
actions and crowded by many actors, good and bad, without ever
forgetting who the real hero is and what stake is to be taken care of.
Although Huntington begins by using an historical approach in con-
structing the stage of the plots he is about to tell-the seven or eight
civilizations-his time dimension becomes flat when he begins to
narrate the story itself. His empirical data is largely derived from
contemporary political affairs-something any well planned thrilier
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used to apply in constructing its imaginary plots. Like any other well
designed thriller, the book can also invite the creative imagination of
its readers. V'hat would the climax of the story be if the reader, in-
stead of the author, was to write it ? In the event one cannot simply
dismiss what is being imagined by the reader as less credible and co-
herent than, and certainly not as more subjective than what has been
written by the author.
The attempt to acquire the relative freedom to participate in the
process of creation, albeit only in one's own imagination, is not only
away to get into the messages sent by the author through the inter-
mediary of the text , but also to reduce the impact of the violence of
words. And Huntington's words can sometime be quite violent. Not
rarely he lets himself be swayed by the impuise to biame the victims.
How would one interpret his comments, that "(I)nless a group can
do as the Bosnian Muslims did and convincingly portray itself as a
victim of genocide and thereby arouse Western sympathy it can only
expect to receive significant assistance from its civilizational kin, and
apart from the Bosnian Muslims, that has been the case'1r The Bosnians
have to have the ability to pretend as if their wives are not raped and
their children are not killed before they can expect any sympathy
from the Vest and receive assistance from its civilizational kin. The
problem is, of course, that the scattered mass graves all over Bosnia
Herzegovina are simply too real to be treated as a make believe worid.
Therefore, why not, even for a while, avoid the violence of the
text? Let's iust for a while pretend that it is a thriller to enioy. What
would the climax of a *orid best seller thriller, called "The blash of
Civilization", be if the reader was allowed to write it? Let's just fol-
low the imaginary plot constructed by Huntington.
The year is 2010. Korea has been re-united. Taiwan has accepted
China's suzerainty. The United States has greatly reduced its mili-
tary presence in Japan and the Far East. That is the time when China
finally decides to establish full control over the South China Sea.
Vietnam resists and fighting occurs between Chinese and Vietnam-
ese warships. In addition to its strong desire to having a control over
the oil -rich scattered small islands, China is also eager to revenge its
humiliation in the !979 war.It launches a full scale aggression at
Vietnam, which in fact, like China, also belongs ro rhe Sinic civiliza-
tion. Facing this massive attack Vietnam appeals ro rhe United States,
its former enemy that has become a reliable ally. The United States
condemns China's military advenrures and asks this core state of the
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Sinic civilization to withdraw. Since China ignores this appeal, the
United States sends warships to the South China Sea. Unfortunately
the ships become easy prey of Chinese submarines. The United States
has to be careful in dealing with China, because borh powers have
nuclear capabilities. It also has to consider domestic p.tbli. opinion.
In the meantime, China has overrun Vietnamese forces and occupies
Hanoi.
India, a long time enemy of China, seizes the opportunity to iaunch
a devastating attack on Pakistan. Initially ir is quite successful, but
soon the miiitary alliance between China, Iran, and Pakistan is acti-
vated. India becomes bogged down fighting Iranian and Pakistani
troops. Both India and Pakistan appeal to Arab stares for supporr.
Vhile Pakistan may appeal on rhe ground of Islam, India warns the
Arab states about the prospect of Iranian dominance in Southwest
Asia. The success of China against the United States has in the mean-
time stimulated major anti-\tresrern moyements in the Middle East.
Radical Islamic movemenrs manage to bring down pro-lVestern gov-
ernments. The Vest cannor do anything to halt this trend. This ap-
parent \ilestern weakness leads massive Arab attack on Israel. A
nuclear warhead explodes outside Marseille. NATO finaliy joins the
war game.
The military successes of China leaves Japan no orher choice but
to jump on the China bandwagon. Though officially remaining neu-
tral, Japan more often than not yields to China's demands. Japan
plays the role of an acrive neurral player in the game. This situation
forces the United States to evacuare all its remnanr rroops in Japan.
Russia, which has rejected China's offer to establish a murual secu-
rity pact at the beginning of the war, decides to side with the Wesrern
power, under the leadership of the United States. This core srate of
the Orthodox civilization suspects that China, the core state of the
Sinic civilizarion, can be a great threat to its security and to its terri-
torial integrity. In the quagmire of the conflict between major civili-
zations the Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Croats join the band-
wagon of their respective core srates by attacking Bosnia. Turkey, a
"torn country", who wants to be part of Western civilization, despite
its thoroughly Islamic characrer, can no longer stay aloof from the
conflict. Two threatening major civilizations are already ar irs gare.
Control over oil is certainly of central importance to all combat-
ants. Since the Arab counrries are already under the domination of
Islamic militants, the Vest becomes increasingly dependent on Rus-
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sian, Caucasian and Central Asian sources. This factor leads the'West
to intensify its effort to enlist Russia on its side and to support Russia
in extending its control over the oil-rich Muslim countries to its south.
\Whatever way this globai war could finally be put to an end and
whatever outcome it might bring, the broader long term result would
almost certainly be the drastic decline of all major combatants in the
war. Since the war has practically devastated China, Korea and Ja-
pan, power gradually shifts to the southern hemisphere. In the event
Indonesia, which remains neutral, becomes the dominant state. \With
the guidance of it's Australian advisors , lndonesia can shape the course
of events from New Zealand on the east to Myanmar and Sri Langka
on the west and to Vietnam on the north. Although this trend may
presage a future conflict with India and a revived China, the center of
world politics moves south."
Unlike the previous global wars in modern times, known in his-
tory as the first and the second world wars, this one is a civilizational
war. Economic and ideological interest have been replaced by
civilizational links as the most important bases of the aliiance sys-
tem. Of rhe seven or eight contemporary civilizations mentioned by
Huntington, five are active participants in this imaginary global war.
The Australian case is an exception. A Vestern country, it is willing
to give guidance to Indonesia, which in Huntington's classification
belongs to the Islamic civilization. This can be explained by the fact
that Australia has become a "torn country", which tries to shift its
civiiizational alignment.'-
Of course this is only an imaginary scenario of the world's future
conflict. Huntington himself hastens to add that "(I)f this scenario
seems a wildly implausible fantasy to the reader, that is all to the
good". By offering this frightening scenario he wants to give credence
to his prediction and to provide warnings to the great powers. If a
global war does finally take place-something which is "highly im-
probable but not impo.ssible"-it is going to be a war between civili-
zations and it is "most likely to involve Muslims on one side and
non-Muslim on the other." In the above imaginary scenario of the
global war Huntington shows how the military and political adven-
tures of the core state of the Sinic civilization, China, not only gives
the opportunity to radical Islamic movements to dominate the pro-
Vest Arab states, but also makes its alliance with the Islamic coun-
tries stronger than ever. It is this newly activated alliance that threat-
ens India, the core state of the Hindu civilization. The outcome of
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the global war is the near toral desrruction of several counrries from
severai civilizations-somerhing no one would like to happen. But
how to avoid this tragic eventuality?
The imaginary scenario of global war can provide two important
lessons for the furure. The firsr is what Huntington calls " abstention
rille" , that is any core state should refrain from intervening in con-
flicts that occur in the other civilizations. The second is the "joint
mediation rule" that the core states should negotiate with each other
to contain fault line wars between srares or between groups from
their civilizations. In other words the vest which has for oni or t*o
centuries been the dominant power in the world shouid learn that it
is now living in the "multicivilizational, multipoiar world"."
I,et's just hope the great powers or the core states of the present
world civilizations would willingly adhere ro rhese well+hought ruies
from the world renowned pundit. However, one should also realize
that the history of the world has blatantly shown how wise words
and good advice from the sages or even the prophets repeatedly went
unheeded and ignored. Political history is full of srories of conflicts
that might have been avoided and of wars thar might have been hin-
dered. Vhat then, would happen, after the imaginary global war-,,a
highly improbable, bur not impossible" scenario-is finally pur to an
end ? Power would shift southward and, as Huntington predicts, In-
donesia would emerge as a powerful state, simply bJcausi it manages
to maintain its neutrality. This sprawling archipelagic state, which
by then has a population of abo.i-22o million and (ifthe Indonesian
government's scenario can be taken as a clue) a GNp of over 3000
thousand uS dollars and has practically eradicated its poverty, can
determine the course of evenrs far beyond the boundaries of the South-
east Asian region. In spite of the fact that Indonesia lies on the pe-
riphery of the Islamic world , "far removed from irs Arab .ent., ",
this country has, neverrheless, every possibility to fill the role of the
core state in the Islamic civilization. After all, as Huntington srares,
along with Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, it is at
the present time a strong contender to become on..tt If, indeed, this
is going to be the case, rhe Islamic civilization would finally have its
own core state.
. 
Huntington does nor say this. He may have srrong about doubt
whether Indonesia can emerge as the core state. He 
-.y .rra' refuse
to see the possibility of the Islamic civilization ever having its own
core state. However, if history can be taken as an idea, one couid
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certainly ask, "Vhy shouldn't the future of the Islamic civilization
be under the leadership of the Malay race ?" In the beginning it was
the Arabs who brought the Islamic light to the world. At the peak of
Islamic political power, the Persians illuminated the world with their
Islamic cultural brilliance, and then, when the'Western civilization
had awaken from its deep sleep, it was the Turks'turn to continue to
carry the torch of Islam. It was so successful that at one time in the
16th century they knocked on the door ofVienna. By the end ofthe
19th century the Turks' Ottoman Empire was already known as "the
sick man of Europe". One century would have passed when finally
-if the imaginary scenario can be followed-the southward shift ofpower gives the Islamic civilization a core state again. The time now
belongs to the Malay race.
If the present situation can be taken as an indicator for the future
there is no strong reason why Indonesia should be dismissed as the
core state of the Islamic civilization after the great global civilizational
war that has been imaginatively constructed by Huntington. 'An
Islamic core state", he says, " has to possess the economic resources,
military power, organizational competence and Islamic identity and
commitment to provide political and religious leadership to the
ummah." Huntington may have some doubts about the ability of
Indonesia to fulfill the last requirement. Nevertheless, if he asks any
Indonesian leader, whoever he or she is, either an Islamic oriented
leader or a secular one, he would be surprised to hear how wide-
spread this opinion about the future role of Indonesia in the Islamic
world is. The more so because they have been hearing the same sen-
timent from several prominent modern Islamic thinkers.'" It is true
Indonesia is located on the periphery of Islamic center, but then how
can one deny the roles of information and communication technolo-
gies in reducing the importance of geographical and cultural distances?
How about the continuing acceleration of the movement of people ?
After all the United States, the core state of 'lVestern civilization, is
located on the periphery of its civilization. TheJudeo-Christian creed,
the essence of 'Western civilization, was also not born in this coun-
try. Betlehem is not located in Massachussetts, but somewhere in
Asia, in a region encircled by the threatened inherited lands of the
Islamic civilization.
The United States to be considered as the core state of the \West-
ern civilization because it is the most powerful nation state, why
can't Indonesia be the core state of its own civilization after the end
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of the imaginary global war? Afrer all, despite Huntington's claim
that civilization is "the highest cultural groupings of people and the
broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which
distinguishes humans from other species" and its "rhe biggest 'we'',tt
in the dynamic of global politics he describes a change of emphasis in
the meaning of the concept of civilization rakes place. It has gradu-
ally become, as \flang Gungwu rightly suggests, "power groupings
made up of nation-states and formed either around shared core cul-
tural vaiues or through readiness to cohere in defense of common
interest against challenges coming from different cultural systems".'
Having its own "core stare" the Islamic civilization would be able-
like the united States in the wesrern civilization-to Dur irs house in
order. "The absence of an Islamic core state ", as Huntington states,
"is a major contributor to the pervasive internal and external con-
flicts which characterize Islam. consciousness without cohesion is a
source of weakness to Islam and a source of threat to other civiliza-
tions".
With the presence of a "core state" the continuing internal and
external conflicts, "which characterize Islam", as Huntington never
forgets to remind his readers would surely be gradually rerminated.
Islamic civilization would nor only ,urn ir, *.rkn.r, into its source
of strength but would also cease to be a "rhrear ro orher civiliza-
tions'. And, what does it mean for Indonesia ? At long last Indonesia
would not only parricipate in, bur also rake the leadership in "safe-
guarding world order, based on freedom, eternal peace and socialjustice". If the fictionalized global war rhat eruprs in the year 2OIO
lasts, say, about five years, it means that seventy years after it pro-
claimed its independence (t9+s) Indonesia finally fulfills one of the
promises of its independence, as formulated in the Preamble of its
1945 Constitution.
Is it historical irony or tragedy that continues to befall Indonesia?
It could finally proclaim its independence afrer the atomic bombs
destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It fulfills the dreams of its-found-
ing fathers after the (imaginary) global civilizational war brings de-
struction to the participating countries. As if Indonesia can only take
benefit from human tragedy. Vhat a fate for a counrrywhose people
are so proud of its desire to maintain peace and harmony.
The Muslims, radical and moderate alike, can still find delight in
Huntington's assessment of the state of the Islamic civilization. No
matter how they look at themselves in the presenr muhipolar world,
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they are now told that the Islamic civilization is actually on a par
with the lffest. More than that they are actually a threat to the other
civilizations. Since only the strong can be a threat to others they
might be wondering why they still maintain their defensive posture.
At long last, after a few centuries living under the shadow of the
myth of the long passed Islamic grandeur, an Indian Muslim, who
may have to suffer the political threat and humiliation from the emerg-
ing power of the radical Hindu political partf , a Singaporean Malay,
who has to endure being a part of the least successfui group in a
country that originally belonged to him, a rich Saudi aristocrat who
keeps a condominium in London and Paris, and a follower of the
betrayed Federation of Islamic Salvation of Aigiers, have something
they can share together in delight. The dream of returning to the
"glorious age" of Islam has apparently become a reality-at least that
is how Huntington rates the place of the Islamic civilization in the
present multipolar world, albeit in negative trepidation and appre-
hension, not to say horror.
Is this imaginary prospect a deviation from Huntington's main
messages in his controversial book? It may weil be that is the case.
Certainly it is far beyond his wildest imagination to make the Mus-
lims proud of their civilization. It is also not his intention to make
the Indonesians have a strong belief in the future of their country.
His main interests are simply to provide a strategic paradigm to un-
derstand the present trends-now that the Cold \Var is over-and to
warn the'West, particularly the United States, about its unique civili-
zation and about the continuing importance of its roie in the new
world order, despite its relative economic, military and demographic
decline. He, among other things, advises the Vest to contain the de-
velopment of the military power of Sinic and Islamic countries, and
to stay away from the affairs of other civilizations. Naturally he does
not have to remind the'Western powers that the alliance system that
have been established between one or two Islamic nation states and
China is largely due to the pressures of the Vest.
The book's scholarly pretense notwithstanding, it is aiso a politi-
cal trap. By rejecting the validity of internal cultural diversities and
conceptually forcing nation states to belong to only one Particular
civilization, Huntington not only advises his American compatriots
-to remain loyal to the legacy of their 'Western civiiization but also
pushes the Muslims into the fold of the so-called anti-West, klamic
"fundamentalists". By ridiculing Turkey as being a "torn country"
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and dismissing the pro-Vesr Arab countries as being undemocraric
and authoritarian he can expecr these countries and others would
finally make their choice ,nd .r..t. rheir "bloody borders".
That is happening now, Hunrington says in his book, not with-
out the feeling of satisfaction for what he thinks as rhe correct assess-
ment he has already made in his controversial article on the same
subject.- That would also be the future of the multipolar world. In
his rather bleak vision of the furure Huntington, as his imaginary
global war suggesrs, tends to see rhe clash between Islamic and Vest-
ern civilizations as a possibility thar cannot be discounted. A conflict
that takes place ourside the direct interesrs of the two civilizations
may ultimately push them to face each other. Is ir a predicrion or a
lure to a self-fulfilling prophesy?
The future global clash is actually a return ro the period of
reconquista, only rhis time it is the radical klamic powers, rather than
expanding'Western powers, that take the initiative. The future of
"clash of civilizations" would finally close the circle of history which
begins with what an Indian hisrorian, Panikar, calls "the age of Vasco
da Gama". Vhat an ending to the cycle that has given thi world its
unprecedented progress, intensive cultural communication, exploi-
tation and sufferings. The dynamic of the "Age of Extremes" , rhat
Hobsbawm talks about, could proceed to its logical conclusion-the
destructive clash of civilization-if the united states does nor pre-
serve its role as the defender of 'l7estern civilization and fails to un-
derstand the nature of the multicivilizarional world.
One can indeed lament the fact that in a time when the world is
lrying to shape itself in accordance with the new demands of history,Huntington not only gives his apocalyptic warning, but also insidi-
ously cultivares a cuhure of hatred. How easy it iJ ro cultivate this
kind of culture, particularly if one uses, like Hunrington does, a flat
time dimensional approach to conremporary events. As it stands now,
Huntington is just a voice of the gallant rvesrern warrior defending
his presumably threatened civilization against the windmill of his
own creation.
Huntington's furure is actually rhe re-crearion of the 16th and
17th centuryworld. Just as what he says, "Asia's furure is Asia's past,,.
Two centuries have passed since the destructions of glorious Asian
kingdoms and a new period is now emerging. A full cycle of hisrory
has.b.een completed. A cyclical view of history is a marrer of philo-
sophical conviction rhat can be simpiy accepted or rejecred. Th.re-
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fore what is a better response to Huntington's apocalyptic vision of
the future and his prediction of the future Islamic-siniCmilitary alli-
ance than an international seminar on'Islam and Confucianism'l held
in Malaysia, one of Hunrington's genuine "cleft counrries"?- This con-
ference, like other similar conferences, tries to find common ground,
when other parties are busy trying ro maximize the elementJof con-
flicts.
In spite of Huntington's high repuration his book is not only an-
other example of the continuing Islam-bashing tendencies in the vest
but also a hindrance ro a mutual understanding. His refusal ro under-
stand the social-cultural and political predicaments of the Muslim
world-the world that has for some cenruries suffered humiliation
from the \(est-only shows his unrepenrant imperialistic ideological
impulses.
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